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SPEECH ACTIVISTS IN SHOPPING CENTERS:
MUST PROPERTY RIGHTS GIVE WAY TO
FREE EXPRESSION?
Abstract: The United States Constitution does not require shopping center owners to
allow speech activists to engage in expressive activities on shopping center property. The
Supreme Court has authorized states to provide greater protections f6r expressive activi-
ties than the Constitution provides. Six state supreme courts have interpreted the consti-
tutions of their states to limit protections to the scope of the United States Constitution.
Three state supreme courts have interpreted their constitutions to mandate accommoda-
tion of speech activists on private shopping center property. This Comment analyzes the
treatment of the shopping center conflict both in the United States Supreme Court and in
state courts. The Comment concludes that state authority should be reassessed in view of
recent Supreme Court decisions that any taking of property from one private party for use
by another is a taking requiring compensation under the United States Constitution.
Shopping center owners and speech activists across the country
have clashed over owners' rights to control the use of their property.
Owners seek to defend their private property rights. Speech activists
seek to expand the areas where expressive activities' are protected to
include shopping centers. In settling these disputes, courts have fol-
lowed various lines of reasoning to produce results ranging from
expansive protection of expressive activities to full protection of own-
ers' rights. Courts that protect expressive activity in shopping centers
under state constitutions arguably infringe shopping center owners'
federal constitutional rights.
I. RIGHTS OF SPEECH ACTIVISTS AND SHOPPING
CENTER OWNERS
Although the United States Constitution protects both expressive
and property rights, neither category is protected absolutely. The
Constitution guarantees freedom of expression from abridgement by
government only.2 Thus, the Constitution protects speech activists in
1. The term "expressive activities" refers to activities of individuals who seek to communicate
private opinions to the general public. Such activities include demonstrations, distribution of
literature, solicitation of signatures, and political activity.
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people...
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952) (first and fifth amendments apply to and restrict
federal government only, not private persons).
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public areas,3 but not on private property, except where a private
entity owns an entire town.4
The Constitution does not define property rights, but it protects
them.5 State statutory and common law, limited by substantive and
procedural constitutional considerations, defines the scope of property
rights protected.6 The Constitution protects property owners against
deprivation of property without due process and against taking of
property for public use without just compensation.7 The government
must compensate a property owner if it takes property through exces-
sive regulation of the owner's use8 or through an actual taking for
public use either by physical occupation 9 or by taking an easement for
public use. to The government may not take property from one individ-
ual for the purely private use of another.'l
Although the Supreme Court currently does not recognize a first
amendment right of expression on the premises of privately owned
shopping centers,'" the Court has authorized states under their own
3. Public property is not necessarily open to speech activists. In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983), the Court listed three broad categories of
public property with varying levels of protection for expressive activity. First, the state cannot
ban all expressive activity in streets and parks because these areas traditionally have been public
forums for expressive activity. Second, if the state opens up public property for expressive
activity, the state is bound by standards applicable to traditional public forums as long as the
property is kept open. Third, the state may reserve certain public property, such as school mail
facilities, for its intended purposes as long as the state does not discriminate against speakers'
viewpoints.
4. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1; see infra note 7.
6. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 473 (3d ed. 1986).
7. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922) (limiting coal
company's right to extract coal was an unconstitutional taking).
9. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421-22, 441 (1982)
(requiring apartment building owner to allow television cable company to attach equipment to
building was a taking requiring compensation).
10. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145, 3150 (1987)
(commission could not require owners to provide easement for public to reach beach without
compensating owners).
11. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 414-15; see Fallbrook Irrigation
Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161 (1896) (private property may be taken for public use only); see
also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-45 (1984) (government may take land for
use by private individuals, but government action must be rationally related to some conceivable
public purpose and government must pay just compensation).
12. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519-21 (1976). The term "shopping center" is
ambiguous. Although it connotes a collection of separate businesses on one unified piece of
property, the number of businesses so joined and the size of the property can vary tremendously
Speech Activists in Shopping Centers
constitutions to offer more expansive rights than those found under
the United States Constitution.13 The first amendment of the Consti-
tution, incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, sets the mini-
mum level of speech protection that the states must meet. 14 However,
in exercising their state constitutional authority in favor of expressive
rights, states may not restrict property rights to an extent that consti-
tutes an uncompensated taking or conflicts with owners' first amend-
ment rights.
1 5
States that opt to protect expressive rights beyond the scope of fed-
eral protection may be infringing on property owners' federal constitu-
tional rights. If a state takes private property to accommodate
expanded protection for speech activists, the state has violated the tak-
ing clause of the fourteenth amendment unless the state pays the
owner just compensation. 16 Some states protect expressive activities
on private property to varying degrees. 7 Other states offer no pro-
tected access. 8 The following historical survey shows the evolution of
and still be within the shopping center definition. There is no principled way to distinguish
which shopping centers the courts may require to accommodate speech activists. It would be
illogical to protect demonstrators in a small shopping center while excluding them from a
multidepartmental superstore. Similarly, other private facilities such as sports stadiums, office
buildings, and medical complexes also attract large crowds and could provide attractive
platforms for expressive rights activists. On the other hand, if shopping centers were protected
from forced accommodation of speech activists, these facilities would not need to be
distinguished.
13. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
14. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
15. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81, 87-88.
16. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (any taking of
private property for public use, even if authorized by statute, must be compensated); Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161 (1896) (private property may be taken for public
use only).
17. California, Massachusetts, and Washington protect expressive activity in shopping
centers. See Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 860 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 388 Mass. 83,
445 N.E.2d 590, 591 (1983); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230,
246, 635 P.2d 108, 117 (1981). New Jersey and Pennsylvania protect expressive activity on
private college campuses. See State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615, 630-33 (1980), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495
Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382, 1390 (1981).
18. Courts in Connecticut, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin find no protection for expressive activities in shopping centers under their
constitutions. See Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201, 1202 (1984);
Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337, 338-39 (1985); SHAD
Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1218, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 106
(1985); State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708, 712 (1981); Western Pa. Socialist Workers
1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 23, 515 A.2d 1331, 1333 (1986);
Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832, 846, 848 (1987).
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the conflict between expressive and property rights in shopping
centers.
II. MANDATORY ACCOMMODATION OF SPEECH
ACTIVISTS IN SHOPPING CENTERS AS
DETERMINED BY THE COURTS
A. Expressive Rights Under the United States Constitution
The Supreme Court first held that expressive rights extended to pri-
vate property in Marsh v. Alabama, 19 which laid the foundation for
the shopping center cases. In Marsh, the Court held that the owner of
a company town could not deprive an individual of the freedoms of
press and religion that neither a state nor municipality could deny.2"
The majority reasoned that because all normally public functions were
performed by a private entity, and the town was otherwise indistin-
guishable from any other town, it was unconstitutional for the town to
prohibit expressive activity. 1 The Court further reasoned that the
more an owner opened property to use by the public, the more the
owner's rights could be circumscribed by the statutory and constitu-
tional rights of those public users.22 The dissent argued that the
owner's rights were also constitutionally protected and that the inter-
ests of a trespasser, although trespassing in the name of religion or free
speech, could not supersede the owner's rights.23
Twenty-two years later, in Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,24 the Court held that a shopping
center owner could not prohibit picketing by individuals against a
store located in the shopping center because the center was the func-
tional equivalent of a downtown business district.25 Although the
Logan Valley opinion relied on the reasoning of Marsh,26 Justice
19. 326 U.S. 501, 503, 509 (1946) (Jehovah's Witness could not be prevented from handing
out religious literature on the streets of a town owned entirely by a private company, where the
town was open to the public and had the appearance of any public town).
20. Id. at 508-09.
21. Id. at 502-03, 509.
22. Id. at 506. This incremental approach might have led to an ad hoc balancing analysis in
all instances where private property owners issued limited invitations to the general public. The
Court started to move in that direction when it first analyzed shopping center activity, but
quickly retreated. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
23. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 516 (Reed, J., dissenting).
24. 391 U.S. 308 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
25. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 325. The picketing was peaceful and, except for the trespass
issue, protected under federal labor law. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-06 (1940).
26. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 316-20.
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Black, who had written the majority opinion in Marsh, wrote the
strongest of three dissents. He stated that Marsh required property to
have "all the attributes of a town," including homes, streets, sewers
and a business district, and that courts should not confiscate private
property for the use of picketers on the ground that the property
resembled a downtown business area.2 7
Logan Valley was the high-water mark for protected expression on
private property under the United States Constitution. Four years
later, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,28 the Court held that the protection
offered under Logan Valley extended to expressive activity directly
related to some use of the shopping center only.29 The Court would
not extend the principle to protect the expressive activity of individu-
als demonstrating in a shopping center against the draft and the Viet-
nam war.30 The Court reasoned that because the shopping center was
not dedicated to public use, individuals had no constitutional right to
distribute handbills against the will of the owners.31 Although the
Court did not overrule Logan Valley,32 it adopted the reasoning of
Justice Black's Logan Valley dissent to distinguish shopping centers
from company towns.33
In Hudgens v. NLRB 34 the Court overruled Logan Valley.35 The
issue in Hudgens was whether striking union members had a first
amendment right to picket a shoe company located in the shopping
center.36 The Court distinguished shopping centers from company
towns and held that, because a shopping center was not the functional
equivalent of a municipality, the first amendment did not protect
expressive rights in shopping centers.37 Acknowledging that the Con-
stitution protects speech against abridgement by the government only,
the Court nevertheless retained the company town exception. 38
27. Id. at 332 (Black, J., dissenting).
28. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
29. Id. at 562-63.
30. Id. at 558-70.
31. Id. at 570.
32. The Court distinguished Lloyd from Logan Valley because the activity in Lloyd was not
related to any of the business operations within the center. Id. at 563-64.
33. Id. at 562-64; see supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Black's
dissent).
34. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
35. The Court acknowledged the conflict between Logan Valley and Lloyd, and stated: "[W]e
make clear now, if it was not clear before, that the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the
Court's decision in the Lloyd case .... ITihe ultimate holding in Lloyd amounted to a total
rejection of the holding in Logan Valley." Id. at 518 (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 509-12.
37. Id. at 520-21.
38. Id. at 513.
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B. Expressive Rights Under State Constitutions
State courts disagree about the rights of speech activists in shopping
centers, even though the constitutions of states that have addressed the
problem contain similar free speech provisions.39 Supreme courts in
three states have interpreted their state constitutions to protect expres-
sive activities in shopping centers over the objections of owners.'
Two states have protected expressive rights on private college cam-
puses,41 and at least two lower courts have-predicted that the highest
courts of their states might interpret their constitutions to protect
expressive rights in shopping centers.42 Six state supreme courts have
declined to hold that their state constitutions protect expressive rights
39. See CAL. CONsr. art. I, § 2; CONN. CONsT. art. I, § 4; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVI,
[§ 17]; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 14; PA. CONST. art. I, § 7; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 3.
40. See Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 860 (1979) aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 388 Mass. 83,
445 N.E.2d 590, 591 (1983); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230,
246, 635 P.2d 108, 117 (1981).
41. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615, 630-33 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (New Jersey Constitution protects right of
speech activist to distribute political literature on campus of Princeton University where
University regulations state that free speech and assembly are necessary elements in the search
for knowledge and insight, a public presence is consonant with the university's mission, and the
university's regulatory scheme is not reasonable); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d
1382, 1384, 1390-91 (1981) (peaceful leafleting on college campus protected in Pennsylvania,
where college invites public to campus to hear FBI director give speech). But see Brown v.
Davis, 203 N.J. Super. 41, 495 A.2d 900, 903-04 (1984) (in New Jersey, individual has no right
to place anti-abortion literature on cars in medical complex parking lot where no space is
provided for public to congregate, there is no invitation to the public at large, and the expressive
activity is incompatible with services rendered by the Women's Center in the complex); Western
Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 23, 515 A.2d
1331, 1333 (1986) (expressive activity not protected in Pennsylvania shopping centers).
42. See Fairfield Commons Condominiums Ass'n v. Stasa, 30 Ohio App. 3d 11, 506 N.E.2d
237, 247 (1985) (demonstration at medical complex not protected because less public than
shopping center); Right to Life Advocates, Inc. v. Aaron Women's Clinic, 737 S.W.2d 564,
568-69 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (speech activity not protected at medical clinic because open policy
of mall not applicable).
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on private property,43 and at least two lower courts have suggested
that the highest courts of their states would follow suit.'
California was the first state to grant speech activists a right of
expression in shopping centers under a state constitution. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, in Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center," held
that the California Constitution" protected reasonably exercised
speech and petitioning activity in privately owned shopping centers.47
The court reasoned that because Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner" was
primarily a first amendment case and did not define the nature and
scope of shopping center owners' constitutional rights generally, 49 the
California Constitution could provide more expansive rights of expres-
43. Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201, 1209-10 (1984)
(Connecticut Constitution does not protect right to seek signatures for ballot initiative in
shopping mall because there is no legal basis for distinguishing large shopping center from other
private facilities which attract large numbers of people); Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby,
423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337, 338-39 (1985) (Michigan Constitution does not require private
property owners to provide access for speech activists' expressive activities); SHAD Alliance v.
Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1217-18, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 105-06 (1985)
(New York Constitution requires state action before state constitution can be invoked to shield
expressive activity in shopping centers); State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708, 712
(1981) (North Carolina Constitution does not afford greater free speech protections than the
protections afforded by the United States Constitution); Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982
Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 23, 515 A.2d 1331, 1333 (1986)
(Pennsylvania Constitution does not require private property owner to allow individuals to
exercise expressive rights on private property where owner uniformly and indiscriminately
prohibits such activity); Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832, 846, 848 (1987)
(Wisconsin Constitution does not protect activity of small dance group demonstrating against
war in private shopping center because Wisconsin Constitution protects speech activities against
state interference only).
44. State v. Scholberg, 412 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (anti-abortion
demonstration at clinic not protected, noting that state supreme court is not generous in finding
expansive rights under Minnesota Constitution); Kugler v. Ryan, 682 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) (antiabortion demonstration at medical clinic not protected, on presumption that
state supreme court would not interpret Missouri Constitution expansively).
45. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
46. The California Constitution protects expressive activities in two clauses. The first clause
grants rights of expression, while the second clause prohibits laws restricting expressive rights:
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or
press." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2. The United States Constitution simply prohibits any law
restricting expressive rights: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of
the right of the people.., to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The California court held that this difference in emphasis meant that the California
Constitution offered more definitive and inclusive speech rights than the first amendment offered.
Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975).
47. Robins, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal Rptr. at 860. A group of high school students sued a
shopping center for access to demonstrate against a United Nations resolution against Zionism.
48. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
49. Robins, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal Rptr. at 856.
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sion than those rights provided under the first amendment." Without
setting any guidelines for regulation, the California court stated that
property owners could regulate expressive activities as to time, place,
and manner.51
The United States Supreme Court affirmed Robins,52 holding that
the expansion of expressive rights under the California Constitution
did not violate the shopping center owner's rights under the United
States Constitution.53 The Court reasoned that the negative impact on
the owner was insufficient to constitute either a taking or a deprivation
of property without due process, because the property value would not
be unreasonably impaired by speech activists. 4 The Court also rea-
soned that the state could require an owner to provide a forum for
speech with which the owner might disagree without infringing on the
owner's first amendment rights, because of three factors. First, the
shopping center was open to the public, making it unlikely that speech
activists' views would be identified with the owner. Second, the state
did not require that a specific message be displayed, so there was no
danger that the government would discriminate for or against any
message. Third, the owner could post signs disclaiming any support of
the speech activists' message.55
Washington followed California's lead in protecting expressive
activities in shopping centers. In Alderwood Associates v. Washington
50. Id. at 347, 153 Cal Rptr. at 860. The decision adopted the reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). The dissent argued that
the majority had exalted rights of free speech over equally important private property rights,
contrary to the Lloyd holding. The dissent found no justification for the majority's narrow
reading of Lloyd and suggested that the only proper reading of Lloyd was that it relied 'upon the
constitutional private property rights of the owner throughout the entire opinion." Robins, 592
P.2d at 349, 153 Cal Rptr. at 862 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
51. Robins, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal Rptr. at 860. Post-Robins decisions by California
appellate courts have not granted speech activists unlimited rights. Compare Horton Plaza
Assocs. v. Playing for Real Theatre, 184 Cal. App. 3d 10, 228 Cal. Rptr. 817, 827-28 (1986) (no
right of access to shopping center for speech activists to present play protesting war, where trial
court specified that maximum of four individuals could engage in discussions, solicit signatures,
and post signs; shopping center manager had discretion to determine dates of activities and to
control offensive language) with Northern Cal. Newspaper Org. Comm. v. Solano Assocs., 193
Cal. App. 3d 1644, 239 Cal. Rptr. 227, 229 (1987) (union distribution of literature in shopping
center protected under California Constitution, even though no stores in shopping center
connected with labor dispute).
52. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
53. Id. at 76-77, 81.
54. Id. at 82-85.
55. Id. at 87-88. But see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 15-17
(1986) (infringement on utility's first amendment rights where utility required to affirmatively
disavow view with which it disagreed in order to avoid being identified with view).
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Environmental Council,5 6 a plurality of the Washington Supreme
Court concluded that the Washington Constitution 7 protected free
expression and voters' initiative rights in an enclosed shopping center
mall. 8 A balancing of the interests favored the activities of free
expression and initiative over those of property ownership. 9 The plu-
rality identified three balancing factors: The use and nature of the pri-
vate property,6° the nature of the speech activity,6 1 and the potential
for reasonable regulation of the speech 2.6  The plurality stated that
speech so unreasonable as to violate property owners' expressive or
property rights would not be protected.6" The plurality reasoned that
because a municipality could not have barred the expressive activity,
the shopping center could not bar it either." The concurring justice
limited the scope of protection to voters' initiatives under the Wash-
ington Constitution.65 The Washington court thus granted speech
activists a more limited right than did the California court. 6
56. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
57. "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that right." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5. "The first power reserved by the people is
the initiative." Id. amend. 7.
58. Alderwood, 96 Wash. 2d at 246, 635 P.2d at 117.
59. Id. The court noted that it could not precisely define the scope of protection afforded
expressive activity under the state constitution and that rules must evolve through court
decisions.
60. Id. at 244, 635 P.2d at 116. The court reasoned that the shopping center was the
equivalent of a downtown business district. This rationale had been rejected by the Supreme
Court in the shopping center context. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (first
amendment does not protect expressive rights in shopping centers because shopping centers are
not the equivalent of municipalities).
61. Alderwood, 96 Wash. 2d at 244-45, 635 P.2d at 116. The court stated that the second
factor favored speech because speech was a preferred right, and speech involving the initiative
process took on added constitutional significance.
62. Id. at 245, 635 P.2d at 116. Without further explanation, the court stated that speech
could be regulated as to time, manner, and place.
63. Id at 245, 635 P.2d at 116-17.
64. Id. at 246, 635 P.2d at 117.
65. Id. at 251, 635 P.2d at 120 (Dolliver, J., concurring). The concurring opinion was highly
critical of the reasoning of the plurality. It characterized the plurality position as "constitution-
making by the judiciary of the most egregious sort," Id at 248, 635 P.2d at 118 (Dolliver, J.,
concurring), and stated that it was not the place of the court to decree that the Washington
Constitution should "be used as a sword by individuals against individuals in addition to being
used as a shield against the actions of the state .... " Id at 250, 635 P.2d at 119 (Dolliver, J.,
concurring). The concurring opinion noted that "[n]ow the court will be able to dispense with
the inconvenience and cumbersomeness of legislative activity." Id. The dissent agreed that
protections under the Washington Constitution should be broadened through legislative action
only. Id. at 254, 635 P.2d at 121 (Stafford, J., dissenting).
66. Massachusetts has limits similar to those in Washington. See Batchelder v. Allied Stores
Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590, 591, 595 (1983) (Massachusetts protects the gathering
of signatures for ballot access in context of large shopping center; allowing owner to regulate
activity as to time, place, and manner is sufficient to protect the limited property interest). But
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III. COURTS INFRINGE ON PROPERTY OWNERS' RIGHTS
WHEN THEY MANDATE ACCOMMODATION OF
SPEECH ACTIVISTS
A. The Courts' Distorted Perspective in Shopping Center Analysis
Beginning with the United States Supreme Court in Amalgamated
Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,67 courts that
protect expressive rights in shopping centers have viewed the conflict
between speech activists and owners from the perspective of the speech
activists' rights. Even in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,6" where the Court
focused its discussion on shopping center owners' rights,69 instead of
defining the scope of owners' rights, the Court withdrew protection for
expressive fights because the shopping center was not dedicated to
public use.7 ° This speech-oriented perspective implicitly construes the
conflict as an infringement by shopping center owners on speech activ-
ists' rights.
States that allow speech activists to demonstrate in shopping centers
may be infringing on the federal constitutional fights of owners. Shop-
ping centers have never been owned by the public; therefore, shopping
center owners do not infringe on federal constitutional rights of
expression by refusing to accommodate speech activists.71 Thus, the
see Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 581, 452 N.E.2d 188, 192 (1983) (even if state action is
not required for protection of expression in large shopping center, small size and non-business
character of the courtyard of research institution is such that antinuclear leafleting is not
protected, even though general public is allowed to use the private property as a passageway).
67. 391 U.S. 308 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
68. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
69. In Lloyd, the Court stated:
Although accommodations between the values protected by [the first, fifth, and
fourteenth] [a]mendments are sometimes necessary, and the courts properly have shown a
special solicitude for the guarantees of the First Amendment, this Court has never held that
a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on property
privately owned ... [n]or does property lose its private character merely because the public
is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.... The essentially private character of
a store and its privately owned abutting property does not change by virtue of being large or
clustered with other stores in a modem shopping center.... We do say that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of private property owners, as well as the First Amendment
rights of all citizens, must be respected and protected.
Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 568-70; see also Justice Black's Logan Valley dissent, where he said that
individuals should not be allowed "under the guise of exercising First Amendment rights, [to]
trespass on ... private property" nor should the Court "confiscate a part of an owner's private
property and give its use to people who want to picket on it." Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 329, 332
(Black, J., dissenting).
70. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 570.
71. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976).
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issue is whether to legitimate trespass by speech activists, not whether
to remedy wrongful acts by shopping center owners.
B. Infringement on Shopping Center Owners' First Amendment
Rights
The Supreme Court has held that individuals have a first amend-
ment right to refrain from supporting or being identified with the
views of others.72 - Property owners' first amendment rights arguably
are infringed when they either may be perceived as endorsing speech
activists' messages or, to avoid such perceptions, must affirmatively
dissociate themselves from those messages.73 Courts that force shop-
ping center owners to furnish forums for speech activists' expressive
activity arguably infringe on owners' first amendment rights,74 because
the first amendment forbids burdening one individual's speech to
enhance the speech of another.75 All people must tolerate the views of
others in public areas, but the state goes too far when it requires shop-
ping center owners to provide platforms for contrary opinions on pri-
vate property.
Shopping center owners' rights not to be identified with contrary
opinions are analogous to newspapers' rights not to accommodate
opposing viewpoints. The Constitution shields a newspaper from
accommodating contrary opinions; it should also shield shopping cen-
ters. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornilo,76 the Court held
that a state unacceptably burdened a newspaper's first amendment
right to choose which material to publish by requiring the newspaper
to print contrary views.77 Newspapers disseminate opinions and seek
to influence thinking. They take positions on issues and invite and dis-
72. See, eg., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1986)
(unconstitutional to put private utility in position where it must respond to opposing view in
order to avoid appearance that it agrees with view); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977) (first amendment includes both right to speak and right to refrain from speaking); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Torlllo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (choice of material printed in
newspaper, whether fair or unfair in treatment of issues or public officials, is within discretion of
editors).
73. See, ag., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 97-100 (1980) (White, J.,
concurring). For example, an order forcing a Jewish shopping center owner to provide a
platform for neonazi demonstrators would deeply infringe on that owner's expressive rights; a
black shopping center owner forced to allow demonstrations by the Ku Klux Klan would suffer a
similar infringement on rights.
74. Id. at 98-100.
75. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 25 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
76. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
77. Id at 258.
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seminate the expressions of speakers of their own choosing. A great
portion of their mission is to inform and influence the public. Yet, the
Constitution shields them from offering space for any opinions with
which they disagree. In contrast, shopping centers exist for commer-
cial purposes only. They do not take public stands on issues or try to
influence public opinion. They do not represent a point of view. Com-
pared with the Court's liberal protection of newspapers, which exist to
engage in expressive activity, it is unreasonable to burden shopping
centers with an obligation to provide platforms for the dissemination
of views with which the owners may disagree, when expressive activity
represents no part of shopping centers' business functions.78
In Wooley v. Maynard,79 the Court held that a state requirement
that a person display a license plate bearing a state slogan infringed on
the individual's first amendment right not to be identified with the
state slogan.8 ° Most, if not all, observers would not equate a state
slogan on a license plate with the personal expression of the driver of
the car bearing the plate. On the other hand, in the shopping center
context, observers might believe that owners would actively promote
their own views through speech activists. If outside observers are
more likely to identify speech activists' expressions with shopping
center owners than they are to identify automobile license plate mottos
with automobile drivers, the states should not require owners to pro-
vide platforms for speech activists' views.
Although shopping center owners may disclaim any connection
with speech activists,8 ' the involuntary disclaimer is itself a burden on
owners' first amendment rights.82 In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub-
lic Utilities Commission,83 the Supreme Court held that the Public
Utilities Commission unconstitutionally burdened a private utility's
speech by requiring it to provide space in its billing envelopes for a
public interest flyer, even if the space in the envelope was publicly
owned.84 The Court stated that "[s]uch forced association ... risks
78. Some shopping center owners may be indifferent to expressive activity unless it impairs
the commercial viability of their centers. However, the indifference of some owners does not
justify the burdening of all. Some newspapers freely accept and print opposing views, but that
objectivity by some newspapers does not lead the Court to mandate objectivity for all.
79. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
80. Id. at 717. New Hampshire could not place the slogan "Live Free or Die" on automobile
license plates, because a system that secures the right to promote ideological causes must also
secure "the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." Id. at 714.
81. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
82. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986).
83. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
84. Id. at 17.
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forcing appellant to speak where it would prefer to remain silent.
Those effects do not depend on who 'owns' the 'extra space.' ,85 The
public does not own any space in shopping centers. When speech
activists are granted access to shopping centers, they occupy private
property. If the Constitution protected Pacific Gas & Electric's right
to deny public use of public space, it should certainly protect shopping
center owners' rights to control use of their private space.
C. Infringement on Shopping Center Owners' Property Rights
Shopping centers are private businesses. The public is invited for
the limited purpose of doing business with the merchants and not to
engage in expressive activities. Speech activists may view shopping
centers as ideal forums for the exercise of expressive rights, but the
attractiveness of shopping centers does not justify infringing owners'
constitutional rights.
The most basic common law property right is the right to exclusive
86possession. Property owners are generally free to choose who may
use their property, when, and for what purposes.87 Persons who, have
been invited onto private property become trespassers if they refuse to
leave when requested to do so.88 Persons with permission to be on land
for a limited purpose become trespassers when their activities exceed
the scope of their invitation. 9 State common law and statutory prop-
erty rights define the scope of property rights protected under the
Constitution. 0 The constitutional right of an owner to control the use
of property should not be denied in favor of a competing right that is
not based on the Constitution or other federal law.91
Property owners' rights to exclude must give way to public welfare
in emergency situations. In some circumstances, public officials such
as police officers may enter private property without the owner's con-
sent9" because reasonable regulation of private property in an emer-
85. Id at 17-18.
86. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 411 (1984);
see, eg., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (requirement of public access to
private pond took "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights," the right to exclude).
87. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 86, at 410-11.
88. Eg., Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 111 N.E.2d 214, 216 (1953).
89. Cartan v. Cruz Constr. Co., 89 N.J. Super. 414, 215 A.2d 356, 360 (1965).
90. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 473.
91. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof;... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
92. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 86, at 412.
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gency is necessary for the common good.93 Emergency entries for the
common good, however, are distinguishable from entries by private
citizens to engage in expressive activities against a property owner's
will because speech activists are neither public officials nor are they
responding for the common good to an emergency. Under the private
necessity doctrine,94 private citizens may also enter the property of
another in an emergency situation without permission. For example, a
boater in a storm may seek refuge at another person's dock.9 5 How-
ever, even the boater in a storm must pay for any damage done to
another person's property.96  Under the public necessity doctrine,97
citizens may enter to destroy the property of another to prevent the
spread of fire.98 Individuals also may enter private property to retrieve
their own property. 99 Each of these entries is distinguishable from a
planned intrusion by a speech activist into a shopping center because
the speech activist's entry lacks the element of necessity.
When the Supreme Court first protected expressive activity on pri-
vate property in Marsh v. Alabama,"o it cited three cases10 1 for the
proposition that the freedoms of press and religion occupy a preferred
position over rights of property owners. 10 2 However, all three of the
cited cases involved claims against government action, not private
property owners. None of the cases involved a conflict between free
expression and private property rights. Nevertheless, the focus on and
favoring of expressive rights was central to later decisions that pro-
93. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523-25 (1934).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263 (1965).
95. Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188, 188-89 (1908).
96. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221, 222 (1910).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 196, 262 (1965).
98. Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853).
99. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 139-41 (W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R.
Keeton & D. Owen 5th ed. 1984); see, e.g., Polebitzke v. John Week Lumber Co., 173 Wis. 509,
181 N.W. 730, 732 (1921) (individual has right to enter private property of another to retrieve
logs).
100. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
101. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 575-78 (1944) (weighing rights of
Jehovah's Witnesses to distribute literature, not against property rights of individuals, but against
right of government to levy tax; sellers of religious material enjoy preferred position over sellers
of secular items because persons selling religious material exercise a first amendment right);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (government cannot require Jehovah's
Witnesses to pay license fees for the privilege of distributing literature; first amendment rights are
preferred over rights of "hucksters and peddlers" in assessing license tax); Jones v. City of
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 597-600 (1942) (Jehovah's Witnesses can be taxed and required to pay
license fees; no comparison with private property rights), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
102. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 509 n.7.
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tected expressive activity in shopping centers.' 3 Since Marsh, courts
have failed to focus on property rights. Some courts have protected
owners' rights, but they have done so indirectly by holding that
expressive rights are not protected, instead of expressly holding that
property rights are protected. 1°4
IV. FORCED ACCOMMODATION OF SPEECH ACTIVISTS
BY SHOPPING CENTERS VIEWED AS A
COMPENSABLE TAKING
Property owners have a constitutional right to compensation for any
taking of their property by the government for a public use.'05 The
Supreme Court has analyzed the taking issue from at least two per-
spectives, with very different results. A taking may be effected either
by excessive regulation of an owner's use of property 0 6 or by an actual
seizure or occupation of property for use by someone other than the
owner. The second category of taking can be broken into two catego-
ries: Permanent physical occupation, 10 7 and easement for intermittent
use by the public.10 8
103. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 573 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 242, 635 P.2d 108, 115
(1981) (plurality opinion). But see Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832, 840
(1987) (judges have no right to exercise personal choices that speech rights should prevail over
property rights).
104. See, e.g., Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 570.
105. See, eg., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). Even though the-fourteenth
amendment does not contain a taking clause, the United States Supreme Court has held that the
fifth amendment taking clause applies to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-41 (1897).
Many state constitutions provide protections against the taking of private property similar to or
broader than those protections provided by the United States Constitution. See, e.g., CAL.
CONsT. art. I, §§ 7(a), 19; CONN. CONsT. art. I, § 11; MASS. CONST. part 1, art. X; id, amends.
XXXIX, LI, XCVII; MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2; N.J. CONsT. art. I, § 20; N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 7(a); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; PA. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. X, § 4; WAS H. CONST. art. I, §§ 3,
16; Wis. CONSr. art. I, § 13. This Comment does not analyze property protections provided
under individual state constitutions, because the Comment concludes that forced
accommodation of speech activists in shopping centers without compensation to the owners is a
taking in derogation of the United States Constitution. However, the careful practitioner should
always check the applicable state constitution for property protections that might exceed the
protections of the United States Constitution.
106. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (excessive regulation will
be recognized as a taking).
107. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)
(government-authorized permanent physical occupation is a taking without regard to public
interest served).
108. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987) (government
may not take easement without paying for it).
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A. Taking by Regulation of Owners' Use
Regulatory cases focus on the use of property by owners. Regula-
tion is allowed where the owner's use causes a severe enough detri-
ment to the public. In early regulatory taking cases, the Court showed
great deference to state regulations.'0 9 However, in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon,1 ' the Court focused on the owner's economic loss to
hold that a regulation forbidding the mining of coal in a manner likely
to destroy homes went too far in depriving the owner of all profitable
use. 1 ' In regulatory cases, the Court balances public interest against
burdens on owners. Courts that analyze mandatory accommodation
of speech activists as regulatory conclude that there is no taking,
because the burden on owners is not severe.' 12 Results have been
inconsistent because the Court has not developed a precise formula for
weighing the balancing factors.1
13
Arguably, it is incorrect to analyze mandatory speech accommoda-
tion in shopping centers as regulatory. In the shopping center context,
courts do not regulate the owners' own use of their property. Instead,
courts take a portion of owners' property rights for the use of speech
activists. In the post-PruneYard cases, the Court established that the
government may not take from one party for the private use of another
without paying compensation.' By analyzing shopping center cases
as actual takings of property, courts will reach results that more accu-
rately reflect the positions of the parties.
B. Taking for Use by Someone Other than the Owner
Recent Supreme Court cases have held that a state must provide
compensation when it either requires owners to allow permanent phys-
ical occupation of property' 15 or imposes a permanent right of public
access to the property. 1 6 These cases identify a compensable taking
without balancing public benefit against private burden, and the Court
109. See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 139-40 (1894) (state could seize and destroy
illegal fishing nets without compensating the owner); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-70
(1887) (no compensation required where state prohibited the production of intoxicating liquors,
because regulation for the public good was not a taking for the public benefit in the sense that the
state's exercise of its power of eminent domain would be a taking).
110. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
111. Id. at 415.
112. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
113. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 86, at 516-27.
114. See infra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
115. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
116. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987).
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has shown a willingness to recognize a taking even where the burden
to the property owner is minimal.
1. Taking by Permanent Physical Occupation
The physical occupation taking theory was developed in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp."7 The Court held that the
state committed an unconstitutional taking by requiring a building
owner to allow a cable television company to attach its equipment to
the building."' The equipment permanently occupied only about one-
eighth of a cubic foot on the outside of an apartment building.Y"9 The
Court reasoned that any government-mandated permanent physical
occupation was a taking per se even if an important government inter-
est was served.1 20 The state had the power to take the property, but in
doing so, it had to compensate the owner. 121
Although speech activists are not permanently present in shopping
centers where they have been granted protection,, their permanent
right to enter is a much greater disability to the shopping center owner
than a cable television box on the outside of a building is to an apart-
ment building owner. The building owner's only burden is knowing
that someone else's equipment is attached to the building. The shop-
ping center owner, on the other hand, potentially faces a multitude of
unpredictable burdens. 12
2
2. Taking by Permanent Easement for Public Use
The public easement taking theory was developed'in Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission.123 The Court held that California could
not exercise its power of eminent domain to require a public easement
117. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
118. Id. at 421.
119. Id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 426.
121. Id. at 441.
122. Owners are saddled with very real and substantial burdens when they are forced to
accommodate speech activists. No state has allowed unregulated expressive activity in shopping
centers, but states have never formulated regulations. The only guidance the courts have given is
that owners may regulate reasonably so that expressive activities will not interfere too much with
the regular business of the shopping centers. See, e.g., Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23
Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 347-48, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Owners
must develop regulations and hope that the courts will find them acceptable. They must also
enforce the regulations and clean up debris left by speech activists. The end result is that owners
are forced to provide the land for the diminutions of their own rights, and they must bear the
administrative expense necessary to facilitate those diminutions.
123. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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across private property without compensating the owners.' 24 In Nol-
lan, the California Coastal Commission's permission to rebuild a
beachfront house was conditioned on the owner's agreement to grant
an easement across the property. 25 The Court distinguished the tak-
ing of the easement from the regulation of the owner's use of property.
The state could regulate the use of the property to advance legitimate
government interests,1 26 but the state could not take an easement
unconnected to regulation of the owner's use.1 27 The Court reasoned
that a grant of a permanent and continuous right to the public to cross
private property to gain access to a beach was as much a permanent
physical occupation as the right to attach television cables in Loretto,
even though no particular individual would be permanently stationed
on the property.1
2 8
The Court in Nollan distinguished PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins 129 on unconvincing grounds. First, the Court reasoned that
the shopping center owner had opened up the property to the general
public.13 However, the fact that the public is invited onto private
property for limited purposes does not make the property public.'31
Many kinds of private property are opened up to the general public,
but it does not necessarily follow that the property is opened to general
use. Anyone is invited to enter a church, a theatre, a sports stadium,
or the comer drug store for limited and specific purposes. Shopping
center owners similarly may issue limited invitations. Invitations for
limited purposes do not metamorphose into invitations for purposes of
the invitees' choosing merely because some people think that shopping
centers should be treated as public areas.132
Second, the Court stated that in Prune Yard there was no permanent
access to the shopping center.' 33 This distinction is particularly
strained. Although the shopping center owner in PruneYard was
given authority to regulate the expressive activity, the owner had no
right to deny access. A distinction between an easement where indi-
viduals may come and go at will and a right of speech activists to enter
124. Id. at 3150.
125. Id. at 3143.
126. Id. at 3146.
127. Id. at 3145, 3148.
128. Id. at 3145.
129. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
130. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145 n.1.
131. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972).
132. The Supreme Court has overruled the dedication to public use theory. Lloyd 407 U.S.
at 570.
133. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145 n.1.
Vol. 64:133, 1989
Speech Activists in Shopping Centers
shopping centers with permission only, where the owners are not
allowed to withhold that permission, is a distinction without a differ-
ence. If the Court applied the Nollan reasoning'34 to shopping cen-
ters, instead of trying to distinguish the indistinguishable, it would
protect owners' rights. Courts that force shopping centers to accom-
modate speech activists take a partial easement in owners' rights to be
used by speech activists.
V. THE COMPANY TOWN REMAINS A UNIQUE
EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court resolved an uncommon conflict in Marsh v.
Alabama 135 when it protected expressive rights in a privately owned
company town. 136 Where a company assumes ownership of a town, it
puts all areas traditionally open for expressive activities under private
control, and it is appropriate that those traditional avenues of commu-
nication such as streets and sidewalks be kept open. The only alterna-
tive for speech activists wishing to have contact with residents of the
company town is to position themselves outside of town on a country
road. That alternative is not viable, because residents may never leave
the town. Company towns infringe on speakers' first amendment
rights by closing off all areas that, in a municipality, would accommo-
date expressive activities. 137  In contrast, shopping centers do not
usurp any traditional public areas. They do not infringe on speakers'
first amendment rights because shopping centers do not assume
municipal functions. 131
134. Id. at 3145.
135. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
136. The law in Alabama imposed criminal punishment on persons who exercised expressive
rights in a company town, even though the town was indistinguishable from a municipality and
no state or municipality could have completely denied the expressive activity. Marsh, 326 U.S. at
502-05.
137. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507-09. It does not matter that the company may have built the
town in the first place and never allowed expressive activity. The infringement comes from
prohibiting expressive activity in the areas of the town which have traditionally served as public
places of assembly and exchange of ideas. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
138. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519-21 (1976). Speech activists can still conduct their
activities in downtown areas. They can set up stations on private sidewalks or rights-of-way near
shopping center entrances. They can often communicate their ideas through mail, and they can
always go door to door if necessary. They can also find large audiences in strategically chosen
locations on public property outside of churches, theatres, sports facilities, entertainment parks,
and other private facilities. Shopping centers have not infringed on any expressive rights forum.
Public areas may not be as convenient for speech activists as shopping centers, but that
handicap is not attributable to shopping centers. Speech activists have never been allowed to
engage in their activities inside private stores. To grant access to enclosed shopping centers is to
provide comforts not previously known. In the past, people seeking an ear or a signature had to
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There are compelling reasons for opening company towns to outside
speakers quite apart from providing platforms for speech activists.
Town residents may have a real need to receive information.1 39 Cases
protecting commercial speech are based on the consumer's right to
receive information."1 In addition to owning the town, the company
is the employer and landlord for all the town residents. Although resi-
dents have a right to travel outside the town, they will often lack the
motivation or ability where all their needs are met within the town.
This complete domination by the company should be tempered. Since
the government does not have a mechanism to monitor conditions in
the company town, it is necessary to grant free entry to private citizens
to help town residents maintain contact with the outside world and
know their rights. 141
VI. PR UNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER V ROBINS IS NO
LONGER THE PROPER STANDARD
The Supreme Court should redefine the scope of state authority to
provide expansive protection for expressive activity under state law.
buttonhole passersby. If the comfortable atmosphere of a covered shopping mall encourages
shoppers to linger, it is no detriment to the excluded speech activists. Shopping centers should
not be required to give what they never took. Even the collecting of signatures for a ballot
initiative was never intended to be easy. See 2 OFFICIAL RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1961, at 2394, quoted in Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188,
378 N.W.2d 337, 350 (1985) (proposition stated during arguments over how easy the initiative
process should be under the Michigan Constitution: "It's tough. We want to make it tough. It
should not be easy. The people should not be writing the laws. That's what we have a senate and
house of representatives for.").
139. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508-09. But see Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519
F.2d 391, 394-97 (7th Cir. 1975) (applying Marsh v. Alabama analysis to find protection of
expressive activity in residential community of migrant workers), rev'd, 574 F.2d 374, 377-79
(1978) (again applying Marsh analysis to hold that migrant community not enough like a
company town to require access to private property for expressive activity); Asociacion de
Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 1975)
(public attributes not strong enough to mandate unlimited first amendment rights in a migrant
worker camp).
140. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 756-57, 773 (1976) (public has a first amendment right to free flow of truthful
information).
141. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507-09. A recent article concluded that the public function
doctrine applied in Marsh should be applied narrowly to all private forums to determine the
extent of access allowed. Under this application, speech activists would have protected rights to
enter company towns, migrant labor camps, nursing homes, and residential college campuses.
They would not have access to shopping centers, office complexes, or private residential
communities. See Ragosta, Free Speech Access to Shopping Malls Under State Constitutions:
Analysis and Rejection, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 40 (1986).
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In light of the analyses set forth in Loretto 142 and Nollan, 143 the con-
tinued viability of PruneYard is suspect. The Court had not yet devel-
oped the analysis strictly protecting private property from an
uncompensated taking for use by others when it decided
PruneYard.t4 Therefore, the Court analyzed Prune Yard as a regula-
tory taking.'4 5 The PruneYard result relied in part on the minimal
impairment to the property's valuable use from the presence of speech
activists. 146 However, in the post-PruneYard cases, the Court estab-
lished that states have virtually no authority to take property from one
private party for use by another without paying compensation, even if
the taking serves a legitimate public interest.147 Furthermore, the
Court established that the extent of impairment of private property
use is not a consideration in non-regulatory taking cases. 148 Even in
PruneYard, the Court implied that if the case had been brought as a
condemnation case, the outcome might have been different. 149
States that have expanded protections of expressive rights in shop-
ping centers at the expense of private property rights have taken a
portion of the owners' property for use by others. They have violated
the minimum level of protection that the United States Constitution
provides for property owners. States cannot address this problem
merely by interpreting expressive rights expansively. They must
respect both sides of the conflict. The state has the power to take, but
if it does so, it must pay just compensation. '1 It is time for the
Supreme Court to reexamine the shopping center conflict with a focus
on directing the states to respect federal constitutional property
rights. 151
142. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
143. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
144. PruneYard was decided in 1980 when the Mahon regulatory taking test was the only
standard. The Court set forth the taking by physical occupation test in 1982 in Loretto, and the
taking by easement analysis in 1987 in Nollan.
145. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81-83 (1980).
146. id. at 83.
147. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
148. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35.
149. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82 n.5. The Court noted that "[a]ppellants do not maintain that
this is a condemnation case.... Here, of course, if the law required the conclusion that there was
a 'taking,' there was concededly no compensation, just or otherwise, paid to appellants." Id.
150. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
151. Even under the PruneYard standard, states should protect private property rights under
their own constitutions. Like the Supreme Court, state courts have focused on expressive rights
in their resolutions of shopping center conflicts. States that have made way for speech activists
have held that speech provisions of their constitutions do not require state action in order to take
effect. States that have not protected expressive activity in shopping centers have held that their
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VII. CONCLUSION
Shopping center owners' property rights are unconstitutionally bur-
dened by forced accommodation of speech activists. Property rights
are expressly protected under both the United States Constitution and
state constitutions, as well as under the common law. When property
rights protected under the United States Constitution conflict with
expressive rights protected under state laws only, the property rights
must prevail.
The public's need for free expression does not justify invasion of
property rights. All public areas which have been traditionally open
for expressive activity remain open. Shopping centers have neither
acted to isolate the public nor to foreclose traditionally public areas.
Shopping center owners' expressive rights are unconstitutionally
burdened when owners are forced to provide platforms on their pri-
vate property for speech activists. The provisions of the first amend-
ment to the United States Constitution apply to shopping center
owners as well as to speech activists. Expressive rights include the
right not to advance another person's free expressions.
If the government does force shopping center owners to allow
access, the courts should require the government to compensate the
owners for taking their property. Courts have repeatedly stated that
expressive rights must be protected without infringing on property
rights. They should give life to these statements and affirmatively pro-
tect the rights of property owners.
Frederick W. Schoepflin
constitutions, like the United States Contitution, do require state action. In all cases, state
constitutional provisions protecting property have been ignored.
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